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uropean Court of Justice
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Since  1998,  the  European  Court  of Justice  (EUCJ)  has  established  a set  of  principles  con-
cerning  patient  mobility  across  Member  States.  At  present,  these  principles  are  challenged
against  a new  background,  i.e.,  an  enlarged  EU and  austerity-driven  measures  in the ﬁeld
of healthcare.  This  is even  more  relevant  in  view  of  the  signiﬁcant  differences  between
countries  and  between  services  on  healthcare  access.  In the Petru  case,  a  Romanian  woman
sought  healthcare  in Germany  due  to an  alleged  lack  of  basic  infrastructure  in  her  local
Romanian  hospital.  A  crucial  question  arises  in  this  context  of whether  the  patient′s inter-
ests (i.e.,  right  to  cross-border  healthcare)  or  the  Member  State′s interests  (i.e., ﬁnancial
stability  of the healthcare  system)  prevail.  We  analyse  this  case  and  its implications  for
future  patient  mobility.  From  the  point  of view  of  patients,  the  EUCJ′s  decision  implies




however  for  Member  States  it is  sufﬁcient  to provide  quality  treatments  in  at  least  one
hospital.  Although  the  Court  has  provided  a solution  for  the Petru  case,  we  argue  that
major  challenges  remain,  such  as  the  deﬁnition  of the  international  state-of-the-art  or  other
limitations  to reductions  of  the  health  basket.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd. This  is  an  open  access  article  under
the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).. Introduction
In Europe, healthcare systems rely on geographical and
embership boundaries, which are necessary to secure
nancial stability and to ensure adequate planning of
ealthcare infrastructure and capacity. In the past, domes-
ic control of the patient ﬂow was viable due to marginal
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).demand from patients to receive healthcare abroad. This is
no longer true: medical tourism has grown at a remark-
able pace, driven for example by American insurances
that offer reductions to policy-holders who are willing
to be treated in other countries [1], and by a number
(5%) of European citizens [2] seeking medical treatment,
ﬁnanced by their public insurer in another EU country
[3–7].
In a ﬁrst wave (1998–2007) of cases (Kohll [8]; Van-
braekel [9]; Smits and Peerbooms [10]; Müller-Fauré and
van Riet [11]; Inizan [12]; Leichtle [13]; Watts [14]; Sta-
matelaki [15]), the European Court of Justice (EUCJ) had
to deal with patients belonging to “wealthy” healthcare
systems, while this was  not true for the second wave
(2010–2014) of cases (Elchinov [16]; Luca [17]; Petru [18])
[19,20].
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Table 1
Stakeholder perspectives in cross-border healthcare.
Patient aspirations Government objectives
Home or abroad Preference to be
treated as close to
home as possible [22],
but they are open to




reluctant, as in terms of
hospital care they have









Quality vs. costs Receive the best
healthcare they can
afford, even if this
results in additional




have to take into
account the welfare of
the whole population;
they may  have to
reduce the average
level of quality.
Timing The patient requires
care on demand, when
it is deemed necessary




plan healthcare both in
terms of infrastructure
and healthcare basket
in order to be
equitable.
Welfare Patients maximise
their own  welfare
functions and consider
their private beneﬁt




the beneﬁt of all the
patients against the
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Although this case-law on patient mobility [21] has
been codiﬁed in the new Directive on patients′ rights in
cross-border healthcare [22], we are not going to focus on
this. Firstly, because this Directive, which had to be imple-
mented by 25 October 2013 at latest, has not yet been
fully implemented in all the Member States [23–25], and
secondly, because under this directive, patients have to
pay up-front, which can remain a challenge, not only for
patients from the new Member States, but also for those
suffering from austerity-driven [26,27] measures. In this
context of new Member States and austerity [3,28–31], the
last case decided so far – the Petru case – reveals some
challenges.
For years, Ms.  Petru had been suffering from a serious
cardiovascular disease and in 2009 she had to undergo open
heart surgery to replace the mitral valve and insert two
stents. As she believed that the infrastructure in Roma-
nia was inadequate [32], she decided to travel to a clinic
in Germany where the surgery was ﬁnally carried out,
resulting in expenses of D 17 714.70 [18]. The national
Romanian court referred the case to the EUCJ, whose
judgment may  open up new scenarios concerning patient
mobility in Europe with the problems brought about by
enlarged EU and austerity. The crisis has increased waiting
times, out-of-pocket payments and has “produced signiﬁ-
cant differences between countries and between services
on healthcare access” [3,28–30].
2. The stakeholders in cross-border healthcare
In the case of cross-border healthcare, patient aspira-
tions to receive better healthcare may  not coincide with
the government’s objectives, as patients are maximising
their own utility function, while governments try to secure
a planned and equitable allocation across patients within
the limits of their budget constraint (see Table 1).
In general, patients are more sensitive to quality issues
and to their personal needs and seek the best care for
themselves. They prefer to be treated close to their home.
However, if they perceive that the level of quality is “suf-
ﬁciently low”, they are open to seeking treatment abroad.
As far as governments are concerned, a certain degree of
mobility may  be beneﬁcial, especially if treatment abroad
is cheaper.
Mobility that derives from patient choices is different.
In deciding whether to allow the patient to go abroad, the
Government has to consider the implications for provid-
ing healthcare to residents. Allowing this patient to receive
care abroad means that the cost of healthcare may  increase,
which will have to be ﬁnanced either through an increase
in the revenue or by a decrease in expenditure. The Govern-
ment, in this case, has to consider several equity issues and
trade-offs. In fact, the welfare gain from patients receiv-
ing care abroad has to be balanced against the welfare loss
of residents whose tax bill will be increased and/or whose
level of service will decrease. For a low-income country, or
for those where the economic crisis has meant the intro-
duction of austerity measures, budget-balance issues are
important and they will certainly be less willing than richer
countries to let their patients travel abroad.evade waiting lists.
3. The EUCJ decision (Petru case)
In the case of a dispute between a patient and his/her
Government, the rulings of the EUCJ have balanced both
perspectives in terms of availability of treatment, waiting
time, coverage of costs and prior authorisation, as summa-
rized in Table 2.
In previous cases, the Court has re-afﬁrmed the princi-
ple of prior authorisation, but it has restricted the notion
of undue delay. In Petru, the EUCJ decided both in favour
of the patient (as also a lack of medication etc. can result
in un-due delay), but also in favour of governments (as the
Member States can comply with their obligation to provide
due treatment in terms of all their hospital establishments).
As mentioned above, it should be noted that patients in the
ﬁrst wave of EUCJ cases basically belonged to “wealthy”
healthcare systems and required treatment that could not
be provided (or was  “less attractive”) in their country of
residence. Treating them was certainly affordable by their
healthcare system and the same treatment intensity could
have been offered to any other resident (on the principle
of equal access to equal need). Most patients in the second
wave of EUCJ cases belong to low-income countries (Roma-
nia and Bulgaria) whose health budget might imply that
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Table  2
EUCJ judgment in Petru [18].
Pre Petru Post Petru
Availability
• Member States basically have the right to determine their
“health basket” [10,14,33].
• Basically, no change
•  However, the international state-of-the-art (“what is sufﬁciently
tried and tested by international medical science”) has to be
taken into account [10,34]; especially for treatment received
abroad which is perceived to be experimental in the patient’s
home country (i.e., possible future developments).
• Impact still to be discussed
•  Not offering treatment at all,  especially in the case of a life-threatening
situation, is very problematic. As the Court has emphasized, “the public health,
and even the survival of, the population” [10] has to be taken into account.
•  A reduction in quality of treatment (if this helps to save money) would also
have to be assessed against the international state-of-the-art (in this case
however, we are dealing with a backward development, rather than with
experimental treatment).
Waiting times
•  Member States are basically competent for the organisation and
delivery of health services.
• No change
•  However, this competence is limited by the requirement “that
the  same or equally effective treatment cannot be given without
undue delay in the Member State of residence of the insured
person” [16].
• Also a lack of medication and basic medical supplies can result in an undue
delay [18].
• The possibility of providing adequate treatment should be evaluated by “all
the  hospital establishments in the Member State of residence that are capable
of  providing the treatment in question” [18], not simply the ones in the area of
residence of the patient.
Undue delay has to be based on an individual medical assessment
[16], where necessary, also after re-examination [14] of the
patient’s health. The assessment is made using international
standards [35].
• No change
Undue delay is sufﬁcient to seek care abroad without prior
authorisation, as long as the treatment is part of the “health
basket” at home.
• No change
Medical and travel costs
Direct payment of medical costs only if a speciﬁc agreement exists
between countries for cross border treatments [36,37].
No change
The  directive on patient mobility [22] provides for an ex-post
reimbursement which cannot be higher than the level of the
home country [14].
Travel and accommodation costs are reimbursed only if they
would also be reimbursed for treatment “at home” (i.e., in a



















•  Patients have to ask for prior authorisation if the hospital
treatment is planned and there is no “undue delay” [37].
aying for patients going abroad could result in a reduction
f the level of care of residents.
. Possible future scenarios
Income differences between old and new Member
tates on the one hand, and austerity-driven reduction of
vailable healthcare on the other, may  signiﬁcantly chal-
enge the role of patient mobility across Member States.
he Petru case is very important from this point of view, in
erms of the decisions taken by the Court, and the questions
hat have not been answered.
In terms of possible changes, ﬁrst, a change in the Regu-
ation on social security coordination [36] is not very likely.
he Directive,  not yet fully implemented, could theoreti-
ally be changed after the Commission′s report, expected
or the end of 2015 [22]. Yet also this second “pillar” con-
inues to be sensitive. Consequently, the question remains
hether, apart from the EU legislator (European Parliament
nd Council), the third major stakeholder (the EUCJ) willement of prior authorisation reinforced, due to clariﬁcation
ing waiting time, as mentioned above.
change its case-law in the future. A complete change in the
case-law is not very likely, since the Court afﬁrmed the right
of patients to receive treatment abroad when the qual-
ity of care in their own  country is not up to international
standards.
However, quality in healthcare is an elusive concept
[38]. Several options are open to Member States in inter-
preting the principle of “quality” and new court cases
challenging this point may  have different outcomes.
One of the most challenging discussions (from both a
medical and a legal perspective) will be the deﬁnition of
the international state-of-the-art, and “undue delay” as
it moderates Member States′ competence to deﬁne the
national health basket. The decisions of the Court, to date,
leave several possibilities open, as such international state-
of-the-art sometimes does not exist [39]. Nonetheless it is
clear that healthcare has to be evidence-based [40]. The
EUCJ′s reference “to all the hospital establishments in the
Member State of residence” can be seen as a challenge for
patients, as it might be almost impossible for them to prove
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that treatment was not available in other hospitals in that
country. However, this challenge is limited by the concept
of undue delay. After this acceptable waiting time, patients
can go abroad if the treatment has not been provided. How-
ever, determining this acceptable waiting time in a speciﬁc
case can be very challenging.
The Court (and the Advocate General) have emphasized
that the regulation “does not distinguish between the dif-
ferent reasons for which a particular treatment cannot be
provided in good time” [18,32]. This is bad news for Mem-
ber States, as ﬁnancial constraints cannot be invoked in this
regard. This principle may  lead to an increasing stream of
patients that travel to receive better healthcare.
However, Member States may  limit patient mobility by
reshaping their health basket or by restricting the reim-
bursement to a speciﬁc group of patients [41]. In this case,
these treatments would also not be available for patients
“at home” and the only argument against this competence
can be the right to life, as enshrined in Article 2 CFR [42],
which would come into play for life-threatening cases.
According to Karanikolos et al. [29], some countries have
already started this process, but their likely impact cannot
be foreseen at the moment.
An argument in favour of a restriction on patient mobil-
ity may  come from an interpretation put forward by the
Advocate General in Petru, concerning “undue delay” due
to poor quality. According to the Court′s Advocate General,
“a Member State is not required to authorise the provision
of a service that is among the beneﬁts covered in a situation
where there are structural [!] and prolonged [!] deﬁcien-
cies in hospital facilities – even if this may  effectively mean
that certain healthcare services cannot [sic] be provided –
except where such authorisation would not put at risk, the
viability of the welfare system in that Member State” [32].
Under this scenario, patients′ mobility abroad would
be severely restricted; moreover, a patient may  be denied
adequate treatment at home without being allowed to seek
treatment abroad. That treatment would in fact still be part
of the national health basket, without actually being pro-
vided. The Advocate General′s proposal would also allow a
country under ﬁnancial constraints to determine the level
of adequate care using national standards rather than the
international state-of-the-art.
This notion of the Advocate General has two  dimen-
sions, one with regard to time (“prolonged”) and one
with regard to intensity (“structural”). This idea has been
rejected by the EUCJ for obvious reasons. From a legal per-
spective, it would be a change of paradigm in terms of the
freedom of services. From a practical perspective, it would
reward Member States that have failed in the provision
of healthcare. Consequently, although the concept of the
ﬁnancial balance of a social security system [8–11,13–16] —
as a justiﬁcation for restrictions on cross-border (!) health-
care – remains valid, a country cannot invoke reasons, that
are not related to cross-border healthcare.
5. ConclusionEU enlargement and the present economic crisis are
challenging national welfare systems and, consequently,
also patients′ rights across Member States. In the void
[
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created by the delay in the implementation of the new
Directive on patient mobility, the EUCJ has recently better
deﬁned the boundaries of patients′ rights: while, in prin-
ciple, patients have the right to receive care abroad, such
freedom is not unlimited.  Each country can set limits to
the basket of services, and prior authorisation might be
required. The latter cannot be denied in the case of undue
delay or poor quality of care, but in both cases it is neces-
sary to prove that no domestic provider could supply the
treatment under the required conditions.
While changes in the legislation are not likely to
occur in the near future, the recent decisions of the
EUCJ may  reshape the role of patient mobility across EU
Member States through the interpretation that National
Governments give to requirements such as “international
state-of-the-art” or “undue delay”. In the paper, we have
highlighted both arguments in favour of a restriction and
an enlargement of patient freedom. Future EUCJ judgments
will determine the future of patient mobility. Although the
numbers remain small, unavailability and quality of treat-
ment remain the major drivers in cross-border healthcare
[2] and this phenomenon should not be disregarded.
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